Abstract Abstract [Excerpt] This study examines the relation between the level of institutional investor ownership and the magnitude of security price variability at quarterly earnings announcement dates. Prior research consistently documents a negative association between firm size and announcement-date return variability. One explanation for this finding is that as more timely, alternative information becomes available on large firms prior to an announcement date, their security prices become informative, thereby reducing the information content of the earnings announcement. Large firms are closely followed by institutional investors. These investors dedicate substantial resources to information search. Therefore, the link between size and information production may be attributable to the influence of institutional investors on the information production process. Because institutional trades can also affect security prices, however, the precise impact of institutional following on the variability of prices at quarterly earnings dates is not evident. 
Accounting Earnings Announcements, Institutional Investor Concentration, and Common Stock Returns

Introduction
This study examines the relation between the level of institutional investor ownership and the magnitude of security price variability at quarterly earnings announcement dates. Prior research consistently documents a negative association between firm size and announcement-date return variability. One explanation for this finding is that as more timely, alternative information becomes available on large firms prior to an announcement date, their security prices become informative, thereby reducing the information content of the earnings announcement. Large firms are closely followed by institutional investors. These investors dedicate substantial resources to information search. Therefore, the link between size and information production may be attributable to the influence of institutional investors on the information production process.
1 Because institutional trades can also affect security prices, however, the precise impact of institutional following on the variability of prices at quarterly earnings dates is not evident.
Evidence obtained principally from a cross-sectional regression of announcement-date stock price variability on firm size, earnings response coefficients, earnings variability, and the percentage of institutional holdings indicates that the degree of price variability at quarterly announcement dates increases with the level of institutional investor ownership. This result suggests that the alternative information gathered by institutions is unlikely to preempt that conveyed by the quarterly earnings announcement.
The sample selection criteria and variable definitions are described in section 2. Section 3 presents the descriptive data and the results of the empirical tests. Concluding remarks are presented in section 4.
1 Atiase [1985] and Zeghal [1984] find that the returns of small firms during announcement periods are on average more variable than the announcement-period returns of large firms. Freeman [1987] reports that the prices of large firms reflect the information content of an upcoming earnings report earlier than the prices of small firms. These results are consistent with the view that the amount of firm-specific private information production and dissemination activities is positively correlated with firm size. The Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure (SEC [1977] ) and The Institutional Investor Study Report (SEC [1971] ), IISR, document that institutional investors dedicate significant resources to information production and tend to concentrate their holdings in large firms. O'Brien and Bhushan [1990] find strong positive correlations between security analyst following, institutional investors, and firm size. Moreover, they find that decisions of analysts to follow firms may be accompanied by simultaneous decisions of institutions to adjust their holdings commensurate with size changes.
Description of Sample and Variable Definitions
Sample firms met the following criteria: (1) Forecasted quarterly earnings for each firm and quarter are estimated from Foster's [1977] univariate time-series model 3 using the previous 12 quarterly earnings observations:
where:
EPSiq = earnings per share of firm i in quarter q.
A forecast error, FEiq, is constructed as FEiq = EPSiq -E[EPSiq], A standard deviation of quarterly earnings, aFEiq, is also constructed using the error terms from the estimation periods.
Residual returns are computed as:
2 Firms not listed in the Spectrum 3 publication but meeting the other criteria are included in the sample and defined as having no institutional holdings. Virtually all NYSE firms are held by institutions and therefore are in Spectrum 3. Since 12/31/78, Securities Act Rule 13f-l requires all institutional investment managers with discretion over equity accounts exceeding $100 million to disclose their holdings. This information is compiled in the Spectrum publication published quarterly by Computer Directions Advisors. Value Line and Disclosure report summary Spectrum information. Rit = return on security i over the two-day period t, Rmt = equally weighted market return over the two-day period t, ai, ßi = parameters, estimated using 100 two-day returns prior to and 100 two-day returns immediately following the 60-day period ending with the quarterly earnings announcement.
The announcement period, t = 0, is the Compustat earnings announcement day and the trading day immediately preceding it. A 60-day quarterly return, QRiq, is computed as QRiq = ∑ 0 = −29 it, where t = -29, -28. . . 0 denotes successive two-day intervals.
An earnings response coefficient, ECi, is estimated over the 28 firm-quarters: QRiq = ai + ECi (FEiq/Piq-1) + ziq, where Piq-1 = the stock price at the beginning of the quarter q.
Announcement-period return variability is measured following Patell [1976]: 4 where: An average U statistic is then computed for each firm as: Table 1 displays the total equity market value, MV, of the sample firms and the amount held by institutional investors (funds) at the beginning of 1979, 1981, 1983, and 1985 . The percentage of the sample's market value owned by institutional investors increases from 34.4% in 1979 to 45.5% in 1985. Positive correlations between the natural log of market value (In MV) and the percentage of fund holdings (PIH) are consistent with previous research that documents institutions' tendency 4 For purposes of computing the U statistic the return parameters ai, and ßi estimated using the 129 two-day returns preceding, and the 100 two-day returns immediately following, the announcement.
Results
to invest in large firms.
Panel A of table 2 provides summary data on the variables examined in this study. Firm-specific measures of market value, institutional holdings, and earnings varability are constructed by averaging the time series of observations over the 1979-85 period. The mean U statistic of 1.63 is consistent with previous studies that document increased return Insert Table 1 Here   Insert Table 2 Here variability during announcement periods. The market value data indicate sample firms are large, with a median market value of $495 million, and with substantial variation in both market value and percentage institutional holdings across firms. The institutional holdings range from 1.8% to 75.8% of the common equity value of sample firms. The average quarterly standard deviation of earnings, aFEi, and the earnings coefficients, ECi, statistics also display considerable cross-sectional variation. These latter statistics are comparable to those reported in Lipe [1990] , estimated with annual data. A Kolmogorov test (not reported) rejects the normality of each distribution. Therefore, the natural log of the variables is reported in the work presented below. Earnings variability, aFEi, is positively related to announcement-period return variability. This relation is similar to Pincus [1983] who finds that earnings predictability (the inverse of variability) is negatively related to announcement-period return variability over interim periods. Lastly, the earnings coefficients, ECi, are negatively related to U. These results suggest it is unlikely that the alternative information gathered by institutions preempts that conveyed by the quarterly earnings announcement. This finding, however, may be sensitive to the effects of other variables not included in the analysis. Potential explanatory variables include the number of analysts following the firm (NANAL), its systematic (BETA) or unsystematic (aRET) risk, the percentage of shares traded (PTR), the average daily number of block trades (DBLK), the average daily volume (DVOL), the average daily number of transactions (DTNUM), and the average daily trade size (DTSIZE). 8 The association of these variables with PIH is examined below and in table 4.
6 Lipe [1990] reports similar correlations between market value, earnings predictability, and earnings coefficients using annual data for 143 NYSE firms.
7 The sensitivity of the estimated coefficients to influential observations and multi-collinearity conditions is examined using procedures outlined in Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch [1980] . No severe multicollinearity or influential observation problems are identified. In addition, a Kolmogorov test indicates the regression residuals are normally distributed.
It has been suggested in a number of studies that analyst following influences the amount of information collected on firms ( Shores [1990] and Lobo and Mahmoud [1989] ). The high positive correlation between analysts and institutions reported in table 4 is consistent with the belief that the information search activities of analysts are in part driven by institutional interests. This positive association, however, would suggest less stock price variability at announcement dates, not more.
Systematic and unsystematic risk are examined based on Verrecchia's [1982] finding that the informativeness of price increases with the risk tolerance of traders. There is little correlation between unsystematic risk and institutional concentration. The positive correlation between institutional holdings and systematic risk as reported by O'Brien and Bhushan [1990] suggests greater risk tolerance on the part of institutional investors rather than less, a finding inconsistent with the price variability results documented above.
Insert Table 4 Here
Verrecchia also shows that the informativeness of price increases as supply noise (the variability of the per-capita supply of the risky asset) decreases. Bhushan [1989] Unlike the "large market" method of analysis, where the theoretical results rely on the assumption that there are numerous traders, Kyle [1989] models informed speculation with imperfect competition. In Kyle's model imperfect competition allows large traders to take into account how their own trading will affect prices; the result is that prices are less informative than prices in a market with perfect competition. The difference in informativeness is due to the 9 The unrestricted regression in 
Concluding Remarks
This research finds a positive association between percentage institutional ownership and 10 This explanation was suggested to me by the portfolio manager of a large balanced-equity fund. The IISR study referenced in n. 1 documented that in 1969 institutional concentration was positively related to both return on equity and beta. The sample's correlation (partial correlation) between average annual return on equity and PIH is .227 (-.023). The correlation (partial correlation) between average annual sales growth over the seven-year period and PIH is -.031 (-.055).
11 This potentially confounding variable was pointed out by the referee. To provide some insight into the effects of correlated omitted variables, I compare the change in a firm's PIH, denoted CPIH, from calendar year 1979 to calendar year 1985 (CPIH = PIH8S -PIH19) with the change in a firm's Ü statistic, denoted CU, over the same period (CU = Um -U79). The Pearson and Spearman correlations between CU and CPIH are .056 (p = .15, two-tailed) and .086 (p = .03), respectively. I also construct a two-sample mean (median) test to compare the CU statistics of the 20% of firms with the largest CPIH against the CU statistics of the 20% of firms with , the smallest CPIH. The mean CU for the 20% of firms with the largest and smallest changes in PIH are .501 and -.254, respectively, resulting in a difference of .755 (p = .03). The median difference in CU is .221 (p = .09). These results are consistent with the relations documented in the body of the paper. They suggest that the association between PIH and U is not just a function of omitted correlated variables.
